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Survivors' Talmud and the U.S. Army 
Gerd Korman 
In many a library stands a set of oversized volumes which appear 
to be ordinary copies of the Babylonian Talmud but constitute in 
fact an extraordinary edition. On page one of each volume are 
sketches of camps and barbed wire, of palm trees from the Holy 
Land. The title page explains. At its head stands a tribute in the 
English language. The set is the Survivors' Talmud dedicated to the 
United States Army of Occupation in Germany.1 
The story of its inception, printing, and distribution deserves tell-
ing. Traditionally, governments, let alone armies, did not publish 
the Talmud. In Europe they usually pretended that it did not exist, 
or they hunted it as the source of heresy in Jewish life.2 But beyond 
that rationale this publishing event has a deeper significance. It is 
part of a special historical moment which fanned post-war Jewish 
passions of despair and redemption; for in the days between 1945 
and 1947 Jews faced alternatives they had not encountered for a 
long time. 
They belonged to a generation that had experienced the Holo-
caust but had yet to hear the UN promise for a Jewish state.3 To 
Zionists the Holocaust demonstrated a long-proclaimed position: a 
Jewish state is the only choice for Jews struggling to survive as 
human beings, and striving for Jewish institutional continuity be-
tween deep pasts and distant futures. The alternative, which gave 
rise to the Survivors' Talmud, involved the rebuilding of Jewish 
lives, organizations and institutions, more or less along the lines of 
the Euro-America past. Among the religiously observant, this per-
spective of the future required a program calling for the quick estab-
lishment of institutions of study and worship in lands where they 
could no longer find the Talmud of their fathers or brothers. 
In 1946, when as special Jewish advisor, Rabbi Philip S. Bern-
stein of Rochester, New York, spoke with his commanding officer, 
General Joseph McNarney, about printing a Talmud in the Ameri-
can zone of conquered Germany, despair about the future of Eu-
1 See, for example, the tractate Shabbat (Munich-Heideiberg: Car! Winter Printing 
Under the Supervision of Procurement Division, European Quartermaster 
Depot, United States Army, 1948). 
2 H. H. Ben-Sasson, "The Middle Ages," in Ben-Sasson, ed., A History of the 
Jewish People (Cambridge: 1976), pp. 477-486, 591-592; Jeremy Cohen, The 
Friars and the Jews (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1982), pp. 51-76, 256-262. 
3 For one set of contemporary assessments of the Zionist option see American 
Jewish Yearbook, 49, 244-265, 444-475, 483-520. 
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rope's Jews was well grounded. In the spring and summer Bernstein 
had placed himself between McNarney's army in Europe and the 
Zionist Jewish Agency. The army was alarmed about masses of Jew-
ish survivors coming into its area of jurisdiction. The Zionist Jewish 
Agency tried to take advantage of the flight from Poland, especially 
after a pogrom in Kielce on July 4, where a traditionally anti-Semitic 
population killed and injured dozens of innocent Jews. Even as 
Bernstein appreciated the spontaneous nature of much of the flight 
toward Palestine, he sympathized with the Agency's efforts to or-
ganize it. Meanwhile as the weeks passed, a majority of its leaders 
had become convinced that a Jewish state in an "adequate" part of 
Palestine was the survivors' only option. At the end of June, En-
gland had struck hard at the central leadership of the Agency and 
its military force in Palestine. In October, at the White House, he 
told a surprised Harry Truman that". . . no Government in Europe 
with whom I have dealt on temporary settlement projects is pre-
pared to accept Jews on a permanent basis."4 
The decision by the Agency to fight for any "adequate" area in 
Palestine and Bernstein's report to the President reflected the grave 
threats Jews faced. All about them were individuals and larger, 
more influential forces seeking to settle Jews and their questions by 
standards practiced before 1939. Russians maintained their fiction: 
"The Soviet Government is consistently and steadily following a 
policy which excludes all kinds of racial discrimination including 
that in relation to Jews." British and American officials pushed 
their version of unchanged attitudes. They saw affairs in Europe by 
the light of their old Russian enemy and by prewar Zionist ambi-
tions. To Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin expressed one variant. On April 27, 1946 he worried about 
aggressive Jews who were "poisoning relations between our peoples 
. . ." just when England and America had to prevent Russia from 
penetrating the Near East. He knew that the Jewish Agency's con-
cern about Jews in Europe derived from its Zionist ambitions: 
"most of the immigrants were carefully selected for their military 
qualities. . . ,"s 
4 Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue: Brichah (New York: 1970), pp. 140-141, 241-
244, 255; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, V (1943-1946), 7595; New York 
Times, October 11, 12, 1946. A convenient introduction to Truman's involvement 
with the DP's and Palestine is Allen Weinstein and Moshe Maoz, eds., Truman 
and the Commitment to Israel (Jerusalem: 1981). For the latest account see 
Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (New York: 
1982), pp. 9-116. See also Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 
1945-1948 (Princeton: 1983), passim. 
5 United States Foreign Relations, 1946, Vll, February 19, 1946, p. 581; ibid, 
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A few days later Gordon P. Merrian, chief of the State Depart-
ment's Division of Near Eastern Affairs, also expressed deeply 
rooted views on the subject in response to a memorandum from 
General John H. Hilldring, then Assistant Secretary of State for Oc-
cupied Areas in charge of DP problems in Europe. By the summer, 
Hilldring, who was well connected to Jewish organizations, would 
press American Jews to slow down the flow of Jewish DPs into the 
American Zone. But now, in May, he expressed an unorthodox posi-
tion to his colleagues. He wanted the United States to support the 
Anglo-American Committee's recommendation for issuing 100,000 
entry permits to Jews in Europe who wanted to go to Palestine. "I 
believe that unless we exercise unremitting pressure to this end 
. . . there will be no effective counteraction to British tactics of 
stalling and confusing the entire issue. . . ." The negative results 
would be feit by the army abroad and politicians at home. There 
"may very well be demonstrations by Jewish displaced persons in 
Germany and Austria and scathing comments by Jewish leaders and 
organizations in this country.. . ." Merrian rebutted with arguments 
reaching for a World War I mantle. Thanks to U.S. support of the 
principles of self-determination, Arab states were created out of the 
Ottoman Empire. As a result, American interest groups, including 
businessmen, had profited since they were not linked to political 
motives threatening Arab well-being. He told Acheson that Hill-
dring's position represented a parochial European view because it 
was not subordinated to America's long-term needs. As before 
World War II, American schools and colleges required Arab good 
will for sustaining their effectiveness. "Our educational interests 
. . . have taken more than a century to build up, and they con-
stituted a sheet anchor in the Middle East when we were militarily 
weak."6 
In military terms this kind of thinking tied American policy to 
British military capacities and to Arab oil reserves. A. J. McFar-
land, an official attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identified the 
April 27, 1946, p. 588, For 1945 see Herbert Parzen, "President Truman and 
the Palestine Quandary: His Initial Experience, April-December 1945," Jewish 
Social Studies, 35 (January, 1973), 42-72. 
6 CJSFR, 1946, VII, May 3, 1946, pp. 591-592, May 8, 1946, p. 598. One example 
of the depth of opposition to Zionist plans to be found in a position memoran-
dum from the State Department's Policy Planning Staff under the direction 
of George Kennan. U recommended trusteeship and included this passage about 
the future if it contained a Jewish state: "The process of assimilation or integra-
tion of the individual Jew in the life of the country of which he is a citizen, 
which has been strongly advocated by World Jewry in the past, would be 
made more difficult, and he would be singled out for attack as an alien political 
factor . . ." ibid, 1948, V, January 19, 1948, p. 552. 
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implications in a memorandum to his generals. The United States 
had to "oppose any actions regarding Palestine which are beyond 
the capabilities of British troops to control. . . ." After all, if force 
has to be used against the Arabs then the Soviet Union might re-
place the United Kingdom and America in "influence and power 
throughout the Middle East. . . ." Such a shift in turn would en-
danger America's access for the larger undeveloped oil reserves. In 
June 1946, McFarland warned that the U.S. may be coming to the 
limits of its resources "within this generation without having devel-
oped any substitutes. . . . A great part of our military strength, as 
well as our standard of living is based on oil. . . ."7 Clearly, loss of 
Arab reserves might even force Detroit to go to the four-cylinder 
engine. 
In the wake of the Kielce pogrom of July 4 these policy consid-
erations continued to reflect the years from the interwar period. On 
July 24, 1946, the special committee evaluating the Anglo-American 
Committee Report spoke for the Establishments in both countries. 
"The overwhelming majority of displaced persons, including a con-
siderable number of Jews, will continue to live in Europe . . ."; in 
German and Austrian communities, the English and Americans 
"are prepared to assist native Jews to resettle . . . and reintegrate." 
Even as efforts by special American investigators to seek and punish 
Nazi financiers, industrialists, and government bureaucrats were 
being blocked by British and American judges and experts on 
international economic relations, the committee claimed that all 
"available means are being used to eradicate anti-Semitism. . . . 
Concentration camp survivors receive special treatment as to 
rations, financial assistance, housing and employment. . . ." The 
committee recognized that many of the DPs, "including Jews," had 
"irreparably" broken their ties with home communities, but never-
theless insisted that "Palestine alone cannot provide for the emigra-
tion needs of all Jewish victims. . . ." Once again the Establishments 
found the proper solution in the past. The committee spoke about 
other countries accepting DPs when Europeans were in fact refusing 
to admit Jews and when it was common knowledge that in the 
United Kingdom and the United States the opponents of Jewish DP 
immigration barred the door.8 
Meanwhile, on the ground in Europe, survivors and Jewish advo-
cates had to deal with Allied soldiers on a day-to-day basis. As the 
army occupied European lands once held by Axis forces, it was 
7 Ibid., June 21, 1946, pp. 631-633. See also Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East 
and the Great Powers (New York: 1955), pp. 310-353, 435-445. 
8 VSFR, 1946, VII, July 24, 1946, p. 653. 
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commanded to learn how to govern liberated populations. Surviv-
ing Jews in particular presented much more complicated problems 
than training groups had envisioned in the United States. Within 
weeks after V-E Day special demands from home on the senior of-
ficer corps in Germany were made by the requirements on the 
ground, by the exigencies of politics and diverse feelings towards 
Jewish survivors among soldiers, Germans, non-Jewish DPs, and 
Jews in America. Harry Truman had to use his presidential power 
as Commander-in-Chief to order his commanders to change their 
behavior which followed policies crudely equivalent to those being 
argued by the State Department's civil service. He called for special 
protection and consideration of Jewish Displaced Persons because 
as Jews they had been especially selected for the Third Reich's exter-
mination policies. Starting in late summer of 1945, the American 
Army allowed Jews autonomous status and provided them with ad-
ditional rations and other privileges. The army also allowed and ac-
quiesced in special relations between Jewish DPs and their Ameri-
can co-religionists at home and in the army itself.9 
This special status did not preclude serious opposition to the 
policies emanating from the highest levels of the army. As Jews re-
fused to be policed by Germans, the army accepted jurisdiction and 
was usually welcomed by Jews as a protective shield against a hostile 
environment. But some Jewish DPs were also involved in black 
market activities. Consequently, the army authorized raids on Jew-
ish camps. Suddenly survivors found themselves surrounded by 
tanks and troops as special units swept through a DP camp looking 
for the tell-tale evidence, usually in vain. Hometown experiences, 
rich in American traditions of bigotry and ignorance, had other op-
portunities for expression as well. It was convenient and, in the chill 
of the Cold War, desirable for occupiers to argue for quick rehabili-
tation and reconstruction, and against special treatment for Jews. 
Early in the American occupation officials in the military govern-
ment pointed to Christians from the East: they constituted a much 
larger number of suffering displaced persons than did Jews. Offi-
cials also considered resident Germans more attractive than Jewish 
survivors: they were less demanding and more trustworthy than the 
9 This paragraph and some of the passages following it, in part are based on an 
informative unpublished manuscript, "The Undefeated; The Story of the Jewish 
Displaced Persons," by Abraham S. Hyman, an American Army chaplain who 
served as assistant to William Haber, General Clay's special Jewish advisor. For 
a critical scholarly account of the army and Jewish DP's see Dinnerstein, Survi-
vors of the Holocaust, pp. 9-71. See also Bauer, Brichah, pp. 141, 344, n. 9 and 
for Bernstein's brief account of DP's and the American Army see "Displaced 
Persons," in American Jewish Yearbook, 49, 520-533. 
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Jews; and especially than the Zionists who, in part because of Stal-
inist sympathizers among them, were often suspect and confused 
with Communists. From the start, for some among British and 
American occupiers, the contrasts went well beyond these sorts of 
attitudes. The British, for example, treated Nazi financiers in ways 
comparable to those of American teams in search of scientists who 
served Nazi authorities. Among the ranks of American army 
intelligence officers some secretly recruited SS officials and other 
anti-Soviet espionage operators from the midst of Nazi Ukrainian 
collaborators and mass murderers. In other words, anti-Semitic sus-
picions and feelings affected the administration of a defeated 
society, itself full of antisemites. In post-World War I days, Ameri-
can government officials had accused representatives from the 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and from the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee of illegally stimulating Jewish emi-
gration from a pogrom-ridden Poland and the Ukraine. Now, mili-
tary officials - not all, to be sure - accused representatives from the 
Jewish Agency of illegally stimulating flights away from the Europe 
of Kielce.10 
The past, which commanders and soldiers brought with them to 
Germany, had also combined anti-Semitism and ignorance about 
observant Jews. A graphic illustration is recorded in George Pat-
ton's diary. During the summer, when it became clear that the army 
had little if any appreciation of the needs and expectations among 
liberated Jews, Patton's behavior helped clarify the problem for 
President Truman. The general's combination of anti-Semitism, 
anti-Communism, and ignorance about Jews ill prepared him for 
understanding religious Jewish civilians. He served as commanding 
general of the famed Third Army which then had jurisdiction over 
most Jews in the American Zone in Germany. In early September 
he and Eisenhower arrived at a Jewish DP camp near Munich. It 
was a visit from mighty warrior liberators to liberated Jews who, 
10 Dinnerstein, Survivors of the Holocaust, pp. 49-71; New York Times, May 10, 
1946, October 2, 1946; Bauer, Brichah, p. 242. See also Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, V (1943-1946), 7431 A, 7560A; Frank Hain, "Status of Jewish Workers 
and Employers in Post-War Germany," Visiting Expert Series, No. 10 (August, 
1949), Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) Manpower Division, 
1-3, 5-10; Tom Bower, The Pledge Betrayed: America and Britain and the 
Denazification of Post-War Germany (New York: 1982), pp. 4-13, 97-99, 160-
168, 394, n. 12; Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in 
Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949 (Urbana: 1970), pp. 146-
147, 239-240. On the charges against H1AS and the JDC see Charles Reznikoff, 
ed., IMUIS Marshall, Champion of Liberty (Philadelphia: 1957), Vol. I, pp. 74-
75; John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativisrn, 
1860-1925 (New Brunswick, N.J.: 1955), pp. 309-310. 
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now, in this camp, worshiped publicly on their first Yom Kippur, 
their first Day of Atonement in liberation. The Jews "were all col-
lected in a large wooden building which they called a synagogue." 
Eisenhower was to speak. 
We entered the synagogue which was packed with the greatest stinking 
bunch of humanity I have ever seen. When we got about half way up, 
the head rabbi, who was dressed in a fur hat similar to that worn by 
Henry VIII of England and in a surplice heavily embroidered and very 
filthy, came down to meet the General. Also a copy of the Talmud, I 
think it is called, written on a sheet and rolled around a stick, was carried 
by one of the attending physicians." 
Considering Patton's orders about Jews, it was only a matter of 
time before he was transferred from his command of the Third 
Army. By the fall of 1945 he was gone and so, for that matter, was 
the army's exclusive jurisdiction of the camps; afterwards, when the 
UNRRA and the International Refugee Organization became 
involved, the military limited its role to police work. 
Even if Jewish DPs and their refugee counterparts abroad could 
not read diplomatic dispatches or private diaries of American gen-
erals, they fully comprehended the hatred and ignorance that sur-
rounded them. Besides their daily experiences, their newspapers in-
formed them. To be sure, these reflected the Zionist passion of the 
leadership of the Jews' Central Liberation Committee in the 
camps.12 This press devoted continual coverage to the Drang Nach 
Paldstina; it stressed especially coverage of the refugee ships trying 
to run the British blockade, and the rising tides of anti-Semitism in 
Germany, as well as in the rest of Europe. Readers learned about the 
charges against American soldiers and officers and their marked 
tendencies toward slipshod de-Nazification. They also heard about 
the difficulties the army faced in preparing young GIs to cope with 
the special problems of Jewish survivors and the relative attractive-
ness of German civilians to those same soldiers.'3 Perhaps Zionist 
propaganda did affect the flight towards Palestine, declared the 
Neue Welt in its first issue on behalf of Jewish congregations in 
Bavaria, but that appeal, the paper argued, did not preclude the fact 
that anti-Semitism made most Jews see their future exclusively in 
Palestine.14 The Aufbau in New York published one report that 
11 Martin Blumenson, ed. The Patton Papers (Boston: 1974), 684-685, 689, 701, 
708, 735, 738, 744, 751, 754. The quotation is on p. 754. 
12 On Zionism among the DP's see Hyman's "Undefeated," and Bauer, Brichah, 
passim. 
13 Neue Welt, 1947; Aufbau, 1945-1948. 
14 Mid-September, 1947, Vol. I, No. 1. 
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translated fear of anti-Semitism a bit differently. The older Jewish 
DPs were selfish, unproductive, and worked the black market be-
cause they had no intention of using Germany for rehabilitation 
purposes. There is no point in doing anything here or elsewhere in 
Europe, they declare. In 50 years "they'll" build another Auschwitz 
anyway. To readers of these papers it was obvious that anti-Semitism 
in postwar Germany was very much alive, that if Hitler returned a 
majority would embrace him. Jewish DPs found it impossible to 
understand how any Jew could ever again think of making a home 
in Germany.15 
Rabbi Bernstein, who was in America in early fall of 1946, con-
firmed these newspaper stories. He reported on conditions in 
Europe at a time when the Zionist alternative was still the only solu-
tion espoused by Jews and their few non-Jewish supporters. Repre-
sentatives of leading Zionist organizations assembled in the Hotel 
Biltmore heard him say that, at best, European countries would 
only provide Jews with a temporary haven. Anti-Semitism remained 
everywhere. Germans may "think that the Nazis were too crude in 
techniques of persecution and extermination. . . . But they remain 
anti-Semitic." He spoke of the continuing flight from the East as 
Jews sought to make their way from the world of Kielce. On 
October 8, Bernstein speculated about a future for Holocaust sur-
vivors if the Zionist solution were rejected. Accepting the Honorary 
Degree of Divinity from the Jewish Institute of Religion, General 
McNarney's special Jewish chaplain saw dark days: "If the decision 
on Palestine should be negative and contrary to Jewish rights and 
needs, the consequences to the Jewish displaced persons in Europe 
would be too terrible to contemplate. . . ."16 
Perhaps President Truman had the last word on the subject. On 
October 9, 1946, McNarney had been quoted in the New York 
Times about the coming winter: the "most critical" stage of the 
American occupation was coming. The influx from the Russian 
zone and from Czechoslovakia was increasing the crowded condi-
tions of Germans; the shipping strike in the United States threat-
ened food supplies in Germany. Two days later, Rabbi Bernstein 
called at the White House to tell Truman the Europeans rejected 
Jewish aliens. The next day a source close to Truman told the Times 
that he had told Clement Attlee, Prime Minister of England, that 
the Jews had experienced a "terrible ordeal" before and during the 
15 Aufbau, April 18, 1947. 
16 New York Times, October 2, 8, 1946. 
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war and still up to now "virtually nothing had been done to alleviate 
their condition since the war."17 
In other words, in 1946, when the subject of printing Talmud vol-
umes was broached to the American Army, a post-Holocaust alter-
native to a Jewish state in Palestine, which required rebuilding Jew-
ish lives, organizations and institutions in Europe, had in fact 
started to manifest itself. At the time, leaders of the DP's said that 
they considered these efforts as transitional programs, preparations 
for going home, to Palestine.18 But outside Jewish circles, and even 
within them, especially in America, the old consensus remained 
powerful: many could not imagine a Europe without Jews.19 As did 
Jewish Communists and Bundists in Russian occupied Europe, ad-
vocates of the old consensus also could not or would not conceive 
of Europe's Jewish survivors as standing in line to serve Zionism in 
Palestine. Instead, they saw migration from Europe as a socio-
psychological response to the pain of the past. Those who allowed 
it committed an act of charity to those who would no longer live 
in Europe where stones reeked of the blood of relatives. The Talmud 
project was another kind of sedative. 
One of the units of American Military Government, if it wanted 
to do so, or if ordered by men of the rank of Eisenhower, McNar-
ney, or Lucius Clay, was especially capable of responding to the 
Jewish request transmitted by Rabbi Bernstein. The District In-
formation Service's Control Command, part of the Information 
Control Division, operated out of Frankfurt and Munich. In 
Munich its offices were in a bomb-cracked building that had served 
as an old folks' home and then as the headquarters for the German 
Army's quartermaster corps. ICD had been conceived before War's 
end in the Psychological Warfare Division, the state-side predeces-
sor of ICD. Under the command of Colonel William Paley, the for-
mer head of Columbia Broadcasting, ICD expected to re-educate 
Nazified Germans. Its authority was wide-ranging, including the 
right to requisition the facilities of printers, radio stations, or the-
aters. By spring 1946 in the Bavarian Zone alone, ICD established 
21 newspapers (with a claimed combined readership of 2 million, in-
17 Ibid., October 11, 12, 1946. See also U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, July 24, 1946, 
p. 653. 
18 Hymart, "Undefeated," passim. 
19 See for example American Jewish Committee. The London Conference of Jewish 
Organizations, February 23-March 2, 1946. See also Nathan Reich, "Overseas 
Aid," in American Jewish Year Book, 49, 227-242; Jacob Kaplan, "France," in 
ibid., 319-324; Regine Orfinger-Karlin, "Belgium," in ibid., 325-330; Andrea 
Tabet, "Italy," in ibid., 347-354; Boris Sapir, "Germany and Austria," in ibid., 
362-380. 
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eluding DP's), opened theaters and movie houses, and launched a 
book publishing program comparable to that of a major American 
house. David Davidson, who served with ICD in Munich, recalled 
years later how he exercised some of that authority. 
I would confiscate printing plants that had belonged to the Nazi party 
and individual Nazis and lease them to the new publishers, search out 
supplies of newsprint and ink, arrange for the salvage of bombed 
presses, [and] supervise a swap of wheels of Bavarian cheese for British -
zone zinc needed for making photographic plates. . . .20 
Jewish overtures to ICD's publishing and printing programs 
came from a variety of people using all sorts of approaches. The 
most important came from the American Joint Distribution Com-
mittee, active in international relief and rehabilitation since 1915. By 
the end of World War II the Joint was the wealthiest and best 
staffed of all organizations in the field; it was active all over Europe 
in relief and rehabilitation programs, including educational efforts 
which required a substantial publishing and distribution program.21 
But there were other important organizations as well. Rabbi Abra-
ham Kalmanowitz, President of the Mirrer Yeshiva in Manhattan 
and an important figure in the Union of Orthodox Rabbis and its 
Vaad Hatzala (Rescue Committee), started his campaign early in the 
American occupation. Persistent and hard driving, as always, he 
made useful contacts with sympathetic and influential command-
ers, and sometimes earned their respect and admiration. In 1945 he 
involved John Hilldring and Lucius Clay by coming into Civilian 
Affairs Division's headquarters for three months "often exhausting 
to no avail every possibility in Army Service Forces about sending 
some religious articles to Jewish DP's in Germany. I [finally] sent 
you a [two-way] radio," Hilldring reminded his friend Lucius, "and 
in forty-eight hours we had authority to make the shipment." Two 
years later, when Hilldring was back home, serving Truman "in the 
Palestine question" at the United Nations, Kalmanowitz could still 
count on him when he needed authorizations from the Economic 
Division of Military Government in Germany. Hilldring wrote Clay 
in 1947: "He is unable to get anyone interested in his project of get-
ting some Tahlmuds [sic] printed in Germany for issue to Jewish 
DP's." Hilldring knew how difficult it was in Germany to manage 
competing claims and projects requiring hard-to-get paper and 
printing materials. But his friend was special. "All I know is that 
Rabbi Kalmanowitz is a patient and appreciative old patriarch. 
20 David Davidson, "Looking for the Good Germans," American Heritage, 33 
(June/July 1982), 90-95. The quotation is on p. 93. 
21 Reich, "Overseas Aid," American Jewish Yearbook, 49, 235. 
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. . . I can think of no assistance I gave anyone in Washington 
. . . that gave me more satisfaction than the very little help I gave 
the old Rabbi. . . .*» 
In the event, in November 1947, Rabbi Kalmanowitz was not 
after "Tahlmuds," per se, but rather the "publications of Bibles and 
religious books in Germany . . ." for the elementary religious 
schools that he had helped to organize in Germany and France, and 
which he now supervised under the auspices of the American Union 
of Orthodox Rabbis. He and his small group of co-workers needed 
from General Clay, and the Military Government of Germany, pri-
ority permits for paper and electric power, and a transport license 
to ship books from Germany to displaced persons in France. Clay 
turned him down, with an explanation, a suggestion, and an expres-
sion of sympathy. "The shortage of paper here is so acute that for 
the next six months there will be no paper available except for the 
publication of essential government documents." He suggested 
using the American Bible Society as a model. It had used its own 
funds for purchasing printing materials in America in order to print 
Bibles "for use of Protestants in Germany." Clay thought that funds 
could "be collected from Jewish people in the United States and 
elsewhere. . . . When such funds are obtained, it can then best be 
decided whether it is easier to print the Bibles in Germany despite 
the serious difficulties of transportation or to manufacture and ship 
[them] from the United States." Appreciative of what his Jewish 
aide later called the "sentimental and public relations value" that 
Kalmanowitz's type of projects had for the U.S. Army, Clay assured 
him "that he had every sympathy for the unfortunate peoples of 
your faith who have suffered so long"; he regretted "that present 
conditions did not permit a more encouraging answer. . . ."" 
These kinds of connections had resulted in ICD's response to 
Jewish requests for all sorts of religious books. As early as winter, 
1945-46, the army, in conjunction with UNRRA, acted upon the 
initiatives from some local DP rabbis in contact with Kalmanowitz. 
In February, Alexander Rosenberg reported to the American Joint 
Distribution Committee in New York on new publications: "Three 
22 Hilldring to Clay, November 17, 1947, in OMOUS Educational and Cultural 
Relations, Religious Affairs Branch, 5/388-2, Folder 22, Box 158, RG 260, 
National Archives; interview with Rabbi Appelbaum, Brooklyn, New York, 
July 24, 1981. 
23 Rabbi Seltzer, Union of Orthodox Rabbis to Office of the Director, Economic 
Division, OMG, November 7, 1947; Kalmanowitz to Economic Division, OMG, 
November 19, 1947, to Clay, November 19, 1947; Clay to Kalmanowitz, Decem-
ber 20, 1947; Clay to Hilldring, December 20, 1947, OMGUS, ICD/ISD, 5/240-
2-43, Box 237, RG 260, National Archives; William Haber to Gerd Korman, 
August 20, 1982. 
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tractates of the Talmud, a prayer book, a Haggadah, a book of 
Esther, and a guide to religious marriage are either in process of 
publication or are already published."24 But these efforts did not 
represent the actual starting point of the publication project Bern-
stein proposed to McNarney. The Talmud tractates and others of the 
books that Rosenberg mentioned belonged to the huge program of 
the army's ICD division. They were publications released in re-
sponse to religious needs in occupied Germany right after the war 
ended. "The efforts made by Information Control in the early 
months of occupation to reproduce religious literature banned or 
discouraged by the Nazis resulted in very generous paper allocations 
to religious publications." Even as late as November 1946, con-
tinued a confidential report from Information Control to 
McNarney's office, "the amount of book and magazine paper used 
for religious works is 336 tons per quarter or about one fourth of 
the actual quarterly delivery from the mills."25 
Among the DP's were rabbis who had been liberated, recovered, 
and who remained strong enough once again to become activists on 
behalf of observant Judaism. Rabbi Solomon Wieder, then in Mon-
treal, in his newly acquired English recalled his activities six years 
earlier in a Jewish DP camp in Windesheim. "I also established 
there everything pertaining to Jewish life, such as Sinagoes [sic], 
Jewish Chadorim, Mickwah, Yeshivos, and Matzho - bakery." He 
also travelled among the different camps on behalf of the dietary 
laws which observant Jews obeyed, even in those circumstances. "I 
was also active to procure Kosher Meat for many other Camps by-
going myself every week to the City of Nuremberg, where the 
slaughtering of catties were under my personal supervision, where 
from the Kosher Meat was distributed to the other camps. . . ,"26 
Rabbi Snieg, and the younger Rabbi Rose, linked the Survivors' 
Talmud project to the Orthodox DP rabbis of Vaad Harabanim, the 
Rabbinical Committee of the Jewish DP's Central Committee of 
Liberated Jews. As had a number of the leaders of the CLJ's execu-
tive committee so, too, had these men come from Kovno in Lith-
uania. Samuel Abba Snieg, who during World War II served as a 
rabbi with Lithuania's military, had been among the trapped of 
Kovno and imprisoned in its Slobodka ghetto. When the Germans 
24 Henrietta K. Buchman to Philip Bernstein, October 20, 1953; Abraham Klausner 
to Tarshansky, November 2, 1950, Joint Archives. 
25 G. H. Garde to Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, 
26 November 1946, OMGUS ICD/ISD, RG 260, NA. See also Neue Welt II, No. 
22 (January 1948), for a fuller description of the accomplishments of the U.S. 
Vaad Hatzala in Munich. 
26 Weider to J0C, June 25, 1951, Joint Archives. 
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dissolved it, Snieg became one of many sent to Dachau, the concen-
tration camp near Munich. American liberators sent him to the hos-
pital to recover his strength and allowed him to join with other 
rabbis to establish in Munich - the headquarters of U.S. military 
government in Bavaria - an organization on behalf of survivors, the 
Agudath Harabanim, a regional central committee of rabbis con-
nected to the Orthodox rabbinate in the United States and Canada. 
In the winter of 1945-1946, when Kalmanovitz of the American 
Orthodox Rabbinate had obtained the help of the army and of the 
UNRRA to publish some Talmud tractates, Rabbi Snieg dreamt 
about printing an entire Talmud, a complete Shaas in the land that 
had tried to destroy Jewish life forever.27 
Samuel Jacob Rose had studied at Kovno's famed Slobodka 
Yeshiva. In 1941, at age 25, he received his ordination but within a 
few months the German army invaded Lithuania and Rose found 
himself in the same Slobodka ghetto into which Rabbi Snieg had 
been forced to move. In August 1944, Rabbi Rose, with his family, 
was also sent to Dachau. His father and siblings died of starvation, 
but U.S. troops came in time to save the ill Samuel. Once recovered, 
he moved to Munich where he became a collaborator in Rabbi 
Snieg's Talmud project.28 
Together with others in the Central Committee who did not have 
Talmud sets or particular volumes for their Talmudic students in the 
various DP camps, they worked out a plan for printing a Talmud 
on German soil. As they had no type available they turned to 
"photostating or photo-offsetting." Besides needing such materials 
as good white paper, cord, and cardboard, they also needed a 
photoengraving Firm with appropriate film and equipment and, of 
course, Talmud volumes from which to make a new set of master 
plates. By the spring of 1946 the rabbis were ready to turn to the 
military. As luck would have it, some Talmud volumes had turned 
up in a Munich cemetery, not far from the Scheiterhof on Lake 
Necker where on Kristallnacht in 1938 Nazis hurled Talmud 
volumes into a roaring bonfire. Everyone assumed other volumes 
could be found, somewhere. The rabbis also located the "right" firm 
in Heidelberg and thought they could lay their hands on the 
required materials. All that remained was to present the plan, 
27 Jewish Daily Forward, December 28, 29, 1950; Der Tog, January 28, 1951; Rabbi 
Manuel Lederman in Denver Jewish News, March 1, 1951. 
28 OMGUS, Information Bulletin, November 1950, 35; Forward, December 28, 29, 
1950; Der Tog, January 25, 1951. 
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together with appropriate endorsement, to the commander of the 
American Army of Occupation.2' 
Rabbi Snieg approached Rabbi Bernstein. He was the Reform 
rabbi from America, who in May 1946 had been appointed as the 
third special Jewish advisor to General McNarney's staff in order to 
assure reasonable working relations between the U.S. Army and sur-
vivors of the Holocaust. Joining forces with Snieg, Bernstein be-
came a crucial supporter of Snieg's project, for he saw all sorts of 
problems which he decided to overcome. Perhaps the hardest task, 
in this early phase, was to find one Talmud set. In post-war Europe 
complete sets were hard to find because in the previous ten years the 
Talmud had been hunted as of yore, in the centuries when, as an em-
bodiment of heresy, Christians had burned thousands of volumes 
at the stake.30 As it was the rabbis started with the cemetery volumes 
and found six more in Switzerland and France, but in the end they 
turned to Shlomc Shapiro, Religious Director of the JDC in Ger-
many, who brought two sets from New York.31 
So armed, Bernstein arranged a meeting for a delegation of DP 
rabbis. They travelled to army headquarters in Frankfurt, to the 
commanding general of the American armies in Europe. There they 
put the questions to McNarney, the soldier who in the war had also 
served in Washington as George Marshall's manager of military 
bureaucracies, who remained well-connected to the former Chief of 
Staff, soon to become Truman's Secretary of State.32 Kielce had not 
yet happened but post-war anti-Semitism had manifested itself 
everywhere. Individual officers remained friendly but more and 
more of the officer corps and rank-and-file in 1946 identified with 
the vanquished, who eagerly wanted to forget the past in order to 
rebuild their nation, this time without Jews. Immigration doors re-
mained shut to most Jews. Palestine and the sea to its west were in 
British hands. 
The rabbis appealed to McNarney for teachers, "Yeshives," for 
children and their families who had to stay in the American Zone, 
that is, for the Holocaust survivors who would have to remain in 
Germany, Austria, in the European past. They appealed for an 
29 Rabbi Bernstein, "Memorandum on Publication of the Talmud," August 29, 
1946; Information Bulletin, August 9, 1949, p. 10, November 1950, p. 35; 
Forward, December 28, 29, 1950; Der Tog, January 25, 1951. 
30 Bernstein, "iMemorandum." 
31 Forward, December 28, 29, 1950; Der Tog, January 25, 1951. 
32 On McNarney, who graduated from West Point as a classmate of Eisenhower and 
Bradley, see New York Times, February 3, 1972; Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We 
Slept (New York: 1981), pp. 594, 622. 
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"evolving process" over whose treasures Jews "have pored in every 
land and age . . ." for "one of the source-springs of Jewish religion 
and tradition." They came on behalf of that very foundation of 
Judaism which National Socialists had tried to destroy. "Every Jew 
in Poland was ordered, upon pain of death, to carry to the Nazi 
bonfires and personally consign to the flames his copy of the 
Talmud."33 
They put their momentous questions to the General of all Amer-
ican soldiers in Europe. Would the army make a major effort in re-
building that culture which the Nazis had sought to obliterate, thus 
vindicating the finest principles for which American democracy 
stands? Would the army provide "the tools for the perpetuation of 
religion, for the students who crave these texts spring from the 
strongly orthodox element"? Would the General print the Talmud 
in Germany? "A 1947 edition . . . published in Germany under the 
auspices of the American Army of Occupation, would be an his-
toric work."34 No Gentile ruler had decided ever before to print and 
publish a Talmud for the Jews. It would be a distinctly American 
event, for it is impossible to imagine a European commander in 
1946 doing what McNarney did. 
Still, from the start, the project belonged to the choices of the 
European past, alternatives with a distinctive American influence 
resulting from the occupation. The dependence on the good offices 
of the Gentile men of power and their brokers was self-evident. In 
this instance sentiment and good public relations for an army under 
Jewish fire at home provided opportunities which McNarney and 
Bernstein could each exploit to advantage.35 After all, President 
Truman, Commander-in-Chief, was also head of a Democratic 
Party about to enter its first post-war election against a vigorous 
Republican Party. 
Beyond such considerations there was also a contrast of passions. 
For the DP rabbis and the Orthodox supporters this was a project 
of urgency, of moment. Rabbi Bernstein, as a Reform rabbi from 
Rochester, New York trying to persuade American officers, may 
have been able to discuss the Talmud in naturalistic historical terms, 
but for Rabbis Snieg, and such Orthodox rabbis as Rose, the 
Talmud was the eye, the essence of their religious devotion and be-
havior.36 In the European past, anti-Talmudic zeal had driven 
33 Bernstein, "Memorandum." 
34 toe. tit, 
35 William Haber to Gerd Korman, August 20, 1982, 
36 Compare Bernstein's "Memorandum" with the Talmud's "Dedication" written by 
Snieg et al. 
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Christian hunters and later the National Socialists. That time was 
over but the Americans did not replace a negative force with a posi-
tive one. For McNarney and the other officers who responded sym-
pathetically to the project, there existed no passion. If McNarney 
and his officers were driven by anything beyond sympathy for the 
plight of suffering Jews, political concerns at home and in Ger-
many, it was by the force of indifference towards the Talmud and 
whatever it represented. 
However, with the general's approval, the military bureaucracy 
started to respond to the rabbis' request. On August 29, in his of-
ficial capacity as Advisor to the Theater Commander on Jewish Af-
fairs, Rabbi Bernstein submitted a short "Memorandum on Publi-
cation of the Talmud." In it he expressed the commitments that 
moved the rabbis and summarized the practical considerations 
which they faced. The multi-volume work was hard to find any-
where for their purposes, in part because there was "a serious 
shortage in America . . . since the American-Jewish students had 
always relied upon the Polish source. There was no printing of the 
Talmud in America," Bernstein revealed to the military. He also 
reported on the needs and printing possibilities as seen by the dis-
placed rabbis and recommended that their "Religious Department 
of the Central Committee" be authorized to proceed with the 
Talmud project. He then stated the obvious. In occupied Germany 
authorization for the use of required supplies and services "must be 
obtained from the Military Governor."37 
By October 8, while Bernstein was still in the United States and 
before he saw Truman, his memorandum and a statement entitled 
"Paper Supply for One Set of 16 Volumes" was in process. Colonel 
George F. Herbert, writing out of McNarney's headquarters, justi-
fied the "extensive undertaking" to the sympathetic Lucius Clay, the 
Military Governor in Berlin, on two grounds. The effort "warrants 
consideration" because of the Talmud's "virtual destruction by the 
Nazis." Herbert's second justification cut differently. He placed the 
project on the kind of comparative basis that sounded reasonable 
but would in fact work against the Jewish project: "religious publi-
cations for the displaced persons of other faiths have been fur-
nished through normal procurement channels."3* 
Since the rabbis' request loomed as an "extensive" one for the 
Army, McNarney's office also asked Berlin to prepare a feasibility 
report. At this point the project involved 3,000 sets of 16 volumes 
37 Bernstein, "Memorandum." 
38 George F. Herbert to Commanding Genera], OMG for Germany, October 8, 
1946, RG 260, NA. 
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or a total of 1,200 printing plates of 8 pages each requiring 
1,980,000 sheets, 1,200 films for photostat procedures or 10,560 for 
offset printing, and tens of thousands of meters of different bonds 
and strips of linen paper. Clearly, Frankfurt needed detailed 
information and recommendations from the Office of Military 
Government for Germany: "Review . . . requirements . . . determine 
the amount of each item . . . available from the German economy, 
with due consideration that in effecting [sic] payment the project 
will be charged to that chapter in the German civilian budget relat-
ing to the care of displaced persons. . . ." Herbert told Berlin that 
Frankfurt did not want the project charged to the "U.S. military 
indigenous budget," and explained that the actual publication of 
the Talmud volumes could be spread out "over a period of one year 
[sic], should this tend to relieve a critical situation. . . . " He did want 
the "earliest practical date," presumably for starting the project, 
although in Herbert's letter that point remained vague.39 
Military bureaucrats went to work on the project and quickly re-
vealed the difference between themselves and the impatient and 
desperate rabbis for whom the Talmud's publication in post-Holo-
caust Europe would become a great historical event. Among the bu-
reaucrats, criteria from the prewar past dominated their desk work. 
Some scribbled on Herbert's memo. One asked "Hebrew or Ger-
man?" Another noted "Talmud is for study research - not like 
Bible" and wanted to know "How many orthodox Jews?" "1 to 18 
for others" came the answer. "Gifts from U.S." also occurred to the 
same scribbler.40 
By 21 November, Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Garde, writing from 
Berlin to McNarney's office in Frankfurt reported on behalf of the 
Director of Information Control, that is, William Paley's office. He 
and the Education and Religious Affairs Branch agreed that "pub-
lication of the Talmud in Germany . . . would be [a] worthy educa-
tional project, especially in view of the systematic destruction of 
this important book [sic] . . ." But now, just six weeks after Her-
bert's request from Frankfurt, the project was "impracticable by the 
extreme scarcity of the materials required and the consequent strict 
rationing through allocation of the small quantities available." 
Garde lined up his evidence carefully in order to follow what IC in 
1946 considered normal procedures. There was no paper available. 
With a representative from the American Joint Distribution Com-
mittee at the "interview," IC and UNRRA had agreed upon "50 tons 
39 Ibid. 
40 (bid:. Edward T. Peeples, Memorandum, File No. IC461 (PUB), January 31, 1947, 
RG 260, NA. 
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per quarter" of paper, for UNRRA's book and magazine needs for 
all the Displaced Persons. "This amount," declared the colonel, "is 
the most that present paper production will allow to be diverted 
from other essential uses." The required materials are "not legally 
available . . ." It was one thing for Rabbi Bernstein's Central Com-
mittee of Liberated Jews of Bavaria to have located what they 
needed; it was another to purchase their requirements legally. Such 
legal purchases could be made only by "licensed German publishers 
and only in such amounts as are needed to purchase the titles speci-
fied by Information Control to meet the required priorities." Allo-
cations for paper for religious publication now had to compete with 
changing demands for "other scientific and other publications es-
sential to Military Government. . ." Supplies had become especially 
tight because coal and other necessities were in short supply. For the 
next quarter allocations had been cut back by ten percent.4' 
These considerations pointed to criteria of comparability as if 
the Holocaust had not occurred. 
If from such reduced allocation for all religious publications in Ger-
many, the requested amount of 115 tons of 70 gram paper were supplied 
to one religious denomination of the several denominations represented 
by Displaced Persons, the injustice to other Displaced Persons denom-
inations and to the religious groups of German nationals could not be 
justified. 
Garde provided what to him served as telling evidence. The U.S. 
Zone contained 1,400 tons of paper. Divided by 16 million nationals 
those book and magazine supplies came to 88 tons for each million. 
There are 190,000 Jews in Germany. All are not "Orthodox." 
Conclusion: "115 tons of paper for one book title even though it be 
the Talmud, would be far in excess of reasonable demands. . . ,"42 
Colonel Garde was obviously a practical man. "An edition of 
3,000 sets of the Talmud," he wrote, "would appear to be excessive 
. . . for the whole of Germany. The libraries now functioning in the 
American Zone which would be satisfactory depositories for such 
sets," he explained a year after the Holocaust, "do not number more 
than ten. For the whole of Germany the number is believed not 
larger than fifty. . . ."43 
Garde recommended following IC's normal procedures for ob-
taining "doctrinal publications" - Bibles, hymn and prayer books -
needed by any religious denominations in Germany. The scribbler's 
41 G. H. Garde, Lieutenant Colonel, AGD Adjutant General, OMG for Germany 
to Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, November 26, 




American Jewish History 
notes had pointed the way: "request coreligionists in the U.S. and 
other nations to donate the materials required." Garde assumed that 
"Orthodox Jews in the U.S. would presumably welcome an appeal 
to supply the materials or funds to purchase outside of Germany 
the materials needed to produce a reasonably large edition of the 
Talmud in Germany."44 
Within a few weeks Garde's recommendations were imple-
mented. His number of fifty for all of Germany became the opera-
tive figure for the army. On 30 January, 1947 Douglas Waples, Chief 
of the Publications Control Branch asked the Information Control 
Division in Bavaria to "investigate and advise" the Director of In-
formation Control "on the practicability of having the 50 sets of the 
Talmud produced under the direction of the Religious Department, 
Central Committee, Liberated Jews of Bavaria. . . ." Rabbi Bern-
stein would supply names and phone numbers needed to contact 
this group and would assist in other ways. His office would also dis-
tribute the volumes at a price that would cover the costs of produc-
tion "plus a reasonable profit." "This price," wrote Waples, "will be 
charged the civilian budget for DP's." Approval from the appro-
priate offices and divisions came in due course, after some technical 
difficulties had been cleared up. The Economic Division of OMGU 
could not "concur . . . without a full statement of requirements." 
Established procedures also called for OMGUS to "evaluate the im-
pact of the proposed procurement on the German economy." The 
official authorization for the 50 sets came on 4 February 1947. Gen-
eral McNarney explained that Rabbi Bernstein "has received our 
original request for the publication of 3,000 copies of the Talmud 
in the light of existing paper shortages and agrees to the publication 
of only fifty sets at this time." The other problem had also been 
solved. "It has been further agreed that American Jewish Voluntary 
Agencies will provide at a future date the paper stock for the subse-
quent printing of all copies of the Talmud in excess of fifty sets."45 
In the next eighteen months, when Jews in Europe seemed to be 
expressing some symptoms of permanent residence in Europe, pre-
dispositions and priorities among army officers combined with the 
mobilization of Zionist passions to crowd out the rabbinic en-
thusiasms which had given birth to the Talmud project in the first 
place. Jewish Palestine and underground migration to it had come 
under British colonial police-state practices. Fighting between Jews 
44 Ibid. 
45 Waples to ICD, January 30, 1947; Garde to ICD, January 31, 1947; Douglas H. 
Patterson to IC Division, January 31, 1947; Beeth to OMG for Germany, 
February 4, 1947, RG 260, NA. 
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and British sailors, soldiers, and counter-terrorists had become fero-
cious. Since the summer of 1946, England's navy had intercepted 
blockade runners in the name of the "Cyprus or Elsewhere" depor-
tation decree. The search and seizure operations resulted in board-
ing parties, "tear-smoke grenades" and "oil sprays" used against 
passengers and swimmers whose "arms were branded with German 
concentration camp numbers." By spring, Jews eager to leave Cen-
tral Europe for the American Zone had also heard about the 
crowded displaced persons camps. And meanwhile, post-war Polish 
authorities had made their borders more secure against unauthor-
ized departures. In sum, events of these months combined to ease 
emigration pressures among Holocaust survivors. For the time 
being the Drang Nach Paliistina had abated and American doors re-
mained all but closed.46 
In such circumstances efforts to develop Jewish institutions of re-
ligion and education seemed more urgent than ever, yet the much 
stripped down Talmud project continued to encounter obstacles. In 
line with occupation practices of confiscation and requisition of 
German properties, the Procurement Division of the European 
Quartermaster requisitioned the necessary printing plant in Heidel-
berg, and in May the American Joint Distribution Committee under-
took to finance, print, and distribute an additional 1,000 sets of the 
Talmud. But by fall, when an order for copies of the new Talmud 
came to the Joint from the Jewish Institute of Religion in New York 
City, the Joint's Committee of Cultural Affairs apologized: "The 
plan for the photo offset reproduction of the four volume Horeb 
edition that we contemplated earlier this year was set aside . . . and 
arrangements are now underway for reproducing the original Vilna 
Shaas. . . ." Actually, the printing had not started, let alone been 
completed. As before there had been too many other priorities. 
Paper shortages interfered. The process for transferring "photo-
graphical print from old pages to zinc plates . . . required col-
lodion," a commercial product banned during the war, and now 
available in Germany only in Zwickau, a city in the Soviet Zone that 
was unreachable because of the Cold War. The army had to order 
the collodion from America. And finally, there had been the impact 
of the weak German currency which had become practically 
worthless; printers would not work for valueless money. For a proj-
46 Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917-1949 (New York: 1949), 
pp. 134-140; Bauer, Brichah, pp. 268-282; Dirmerstein, Survivors of the 
Holocaust, pp. 136-182. See also Hyman, "Undefeated," passim, and George 
Kirk, "The Middle East 1945-1950," in Arnold Toynbee, ed„ Survey of Interna-
tional Affairs (London: 1950), pp. 187-251. 
m 
American Jewish History 
ect that was to be partially funded by the German economy, the cur-
rency crisis meant delays until the economic reforms of the late 
spring of 1948.47 
As 1947 and early 1948 witnessed these obstacles and delays, the 
urgent need for rapid development of Jewish educational and 
religious institutions in the lands of the Displaced Persons also did 
not bring Jewish efforts that could match the enthusiasm of the 
founders of the project. The very news that helped to dampen the 
Drang Nach Palastina also helped to fuel the Zionist movement 
among the Jews of the post-Holocaust world. From the moment 
that Bevin referred the Palestine question to the United Nations, on 
February 18, 1947, the critical struggle for homeland and even state-
hood had been joined. British tactics, at the UN and among U.S. 
State Department supporters of English aims in the Arab world, 
kept results in doubt up to the last moment. Even in the days when 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union both had decided to support partition 
of Palestine, Britain's refusal to use its troops to enforce a UN 
Assembly's decision on partition left His Majesty's Government 
considerable influence in affecting the outcome, in debates and in 
the casting of ballots. In such circumstances Zionism and its 
demands became the primary magnet attracting the allegiance of 
most Jews. After November 29, the day the UN voted for partition, 
the attractions intensified; for the vote was followed by a full-scale 
civil war between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, and after May 
15, 1948, by a war between the newly established state of Israel and 
its neighboring Arab states.48 
Perhaps, if organized Orthodox Jewry and devotees of Talmud 
had enjoyed a larger following and had been less sectarian in nature, 
the passions of DP rabbis would have been matched by dollars and 
decisiveness. Telling in this respect was a note from Shapiro to New 
York around the time the project was coming to an end. At the 
beginning of it, his staff in Paris did not know much about the 
Talmud: 
. . . you will be interested to know that there has been a great amount 
of reading of books about the Talmud among members of our staff as 
a result of our involvement in the project . . . Many people became 
involved in one way or another in the Transportation Department, in the 
Accounting Department, in the Budget Department, and in turn those 
47 Edward M. Warburg to David Niles, March 11, 1945; Edward Phillips to Edward 
Kiev, October 20, 1947, .Joint Archives; Bernard Quinn, in Information Bulletin, 
November 1950, 33-35; Forward, December 29, 1950. 
48 For recent contributions to the extensive literature on these months see Weinstein 
and Maoz, Truman, 82-151. 
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who are in close relationship with these departments have been request-
ing material on the subject and we have not enough to go around.4' 
It was also revealing that Bernstein did not mention the Talmud 
project in his American Jewish Yearbook report on "Displaced 
Persons." In fact, in that volume it is mentioned once, and then only 
in passing and incorrectly. 
The religious Department of the JDC was instrumental in organizing 
kosher slaughtering for the Jewish population in the camps and the 
communities. As of December 1946, some 35,000 prayer books and 
thousands of other religious prerequisities were distributed including 
1000 sets {sic] of the Talmud, especially printed by JDC with the co-
operation of the U.S. Army and distributed among the students of the 
many Yeshivoth maintained in the camps.so 
Between 1946 and 1948 the large majority of Jews in Europe, 
America and Palestine were simply preoccupied with other pro-
grams. Only a distinct minority knew or cared about Talmud or 
Yeshivot; neither was held in esteem. Few shared the passions of the 
Kovno rabbis. The DP's hungered for new secular homes outside of 
Europe. In America Jews hurried into lives shaped by the clocks, 
rhythms, styles, and values of the Gentile middle classes. 
In these months Jewish leaders in the ranks of American labor, 
and business, and in the domain of the professions, who were in-
fluential in Jewish affairs and in American politics, still took seri-
ously ideological devotions, especially their anti-clerical convic-
tions. In that sense they also belonged to the same past that had 
shaped so much of the outlook of officialdom serving the Ameri-
can people in Washington and in the military occupation of 
Germany. They were attracted to an intensifying Zionist movement 
itself dominated by anti-clerical and anti-Orthodox Jews. They were 
rallied to fight for opening U.S. immigration doors for Displaced 
Persons. But in 1947 and 1948 when army priorities and German 
economic conditions precluded printing the Talmud, American 
Jews or money could not be especially mobilized on behalf of the 
Survivors' Talmud project. It simply remained one of a number of 
projects in the Joint's relief and rehabilitation program for Jews 
who had survived the Holocaust. 
The actual printing occurred as almost all of the Jews for whom 
the project had been undertaken in the first place left for the United 
49 Shapiro to Tarshansky, February 5, 1951, Joint Archives. 
50 Keich, "Overseas Relief," American Jewish Yearbook, 49, 236. Herbert Agar, The 
Saving Remnant: An Account of Jewish Survival Since 1914 (London: I960), pp. 
168-192 and Oscar Handlin, A Continuing Task: The American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee (New York: 1964), pp. 90-106 also did not mention the 
Talmud project. • 
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States or Israel. Between July 1948 and 1952 about 58,000 Jews 
arrived in America; in 1949 over 31,000 entered; in 1950, 10,000; in 
1951 and 1952, 13,500 arrived each year. Between May 1948 and the 
end of 1951 about 304,000 Jews from Central Europe arrived in 
Israel. In other words, the printing started after most survivors of 
the Holocaust had begun to orient their thoughts about the future 
towards Israel and its policy of free and open Jewish immigration, 
that is after almost all of them had decided to leave Europe.51 
Under Rabbi Rose's close supervision, and sometimes with the 
help of Theodore Schwartz, the Secretary of the Agudat Harabanim 
in Munich, the actual printing at Carl Winter in Heidelberg started 
in November 1948 and then proceeded apace. The first volume 
served as an object of muffled celebration. Two single volumes went 
from Germany to the Joint in New York, both targeted for inter-
national conferences, one held by the Joint and the other by the 
United Jewish Appeal. In Munich DP rabbis and Rabbi Shapiro, 
the Joint's Director of Religious Affairs, had big plans befitting the 
special moment for which they had waited so long: "We are 
planning a world-wide presentation in Germany to General L. Clay, 
in the United States to President Truman and General Eisenhower, 
and in Israel to Dr. Weitzman [sic] and Rabbi I. Hertzog [sic]. 
. . ." (Incidentially," wrote Shapiro, "we think it would be a good 
idea if Rabbi Snieg and myself could make the presentation in 
Israel. . . ,"52 
But in New York the passion of the Munich rabbis did not de-
termine priorities. In these days all Jewish eyes rested on Israel's 
victories over the Arabs. Truman, who had recognized the new state 
in May, had won the election in November and needed now, in 1949, 
to cope with angry Britishers and Arabs and their supporters in the 
United States. Raphael Levy, the Joint's director of publicity, 
appreciated American realities. He recognized a "publicity stunt" 
when he saw one. Shapiro's approach was too complicated, the 
interests too diffuse; each would "cut into the publicity" for the 
Talmud project. Levy opted for the clear and simple approach. 
"Frankly, I suggest we pick a two-man team representing JDC . . . 
and have them make a presentation. . . ." In Germany it was recom-
mended that the presentation to General Clay should take place at 
once, "particularly in view of the fact that he may shortly be leaving 
the American Zone." In the United States delay was in order, till a 
51 Dinnerstein, Survivors of the Holocaust, p. 251; Ben-Sasson, Jewish People, p. 
1076. 
52 Shapiro to Haber, June 15, 1950; Haber to Shapiro, June 20, 1950; Shapiro to 
Tarshansky, December 29, 1948, February 9, 1949; Theodore Schwartz to JDC, 
March 5, 1951, Joint Archives. 
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time "when the United Jewish Appeal settles down and when it 
looks appropriate . . . [to] approach Truman with the idea of 
presenting . . . [a volume] to him." And then, warned Levy, let's 
remember who he is. "President Truman's days seem to be very 
busy and he is not at the beck and call of press agents and their 
stunts. . . ."" 
Edward M. Warburg, the Joint's chairman, explored the Truman 
option with David Niles. Niles, a Jew, was one of the President's 
important personal advisors who specialized in Jewish affairs. With 
Hilldring he had helped to orchestrate the partition vote of Novem-
ber 29. Could Niles advise and help "in bringing to the attention of 
the public a most unusual event-the publication of the first edition 
of the Talmud printed in Germany since the rise of Hitler." Warburg 
appreciated the occasion. "The publisher of this new edition of the 
Talmud is the United States Government!" The Joint thought that 
a "presentation to the President of the first copy of the newly pub-
lished Talmud will serve to dramatize to the world the enlightened 
role of our Army and our Government as champions of religious 
freedom." Niles responded quickly and directly. He wrote "Eddie" 
that "of course, 1 want to do everything I can to help publicize the 
Talmud printed in Germany." But there were schedules and prior-
ities. "I will take the matter up with my Chief as soon as he returns 
from his vacation in Key West and try to get word to you some time 
next week."54 
As it turned out, there was no ceremony involving Truman or 
Eisenhower, the chief commanders of the army whose European 
and ranking generals in Germany had helped the DP rabbis. Levy 
opposed getting into "an elaborate series of presentations here in 
the United States." Without explanation he suggested presentations 
"be done without publicity fanfare. . . ." In May 1949 General Clay 
received his volume. So, too, did Chaim Weizmann, the first presi-
dent of Israel.55 
Meanwhile, at Carl Winter's print shop the work continued to 
completion. Large sheets of paper, larger than the "top of an office 
desk, with each containing eight separate pages in Hebraic and 
Aramaic characters . . . " reported Bernard Quinn to readers of a 
military government publication, "caught by tender hands, were 
carefully guided into an attached bin - one on top of the other -
and smoothed with the greatest of care. . . ." Before long it became 
53 Levy to Buchman, Memo, March 3, 1949, Joint Archives. 
54 "Warburg to Niles, March 11, 1949, Joint Archives. 
55 Levy to Buchman, March 3, 1949; Leo Jung in JDC News Release, February 1, 
1951, Joint Archives. 
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obvious that the plans for sixteen volumes per set were insufficient. 
A final change was required and the army and Joint obliged. Rabbi 
Rose and his associates received permission to go to nineteen 
volumes. For the next seventeen months he read proof on 1,800 zinc 
plates. By mid-June of 1950 the end was in sight and on 16 Novem-
ber 1950 it had come: ". . . we are Gott sei Dank packing the Tal-
mud," a Joint official wrote. Shipments out of Germany, he 
thought, would begin in two weeks. At this point the army exercised 
its influence over the Talmud project for the last time Together with 
Rabbi Snieg its officials wanted forty, not the fifty sets the army 
had agreed to print, to remain in Germany. The army thought that 
"some of these books printed in Germany should be left . . ." in 
Germany.56 
The Joint's Paris office directed the export traffic. On November 
30, it advised New York that "45 cases of the Talmud for New York 
(our shipping ticket 10.048) were shipped from Munich to Antwerp 
yesterday." Within days New York informed that it needed fifteen 
more cases. Paris made the adjustment. In this first major shipment 
300 cases also went to Israel, via Marseilles, twenty-two to France 
and Algeria, ten to Italy, five to Hungary, five to Morocco, three to 
Tunisia, and one case each to South Africa, Greece, Yugoslavia, 
Norway, and Sweden. All told, Paris thought it had 650 cases or sets 
for export, with most going to Israel, a large number to the United 
States, and the rest scattered among countries of Europe, South 
America, and North Africa.57 
The actual distribution of each Talmud set, or Shaas, to selected 
individuals and institutions revealed still other priorities as post-
Holocaust Jews responded with mixed emotions and attitudes 
toward the DP rabbis' treasure. From the start, Judah Shapiro, the 
senior Joint official in Paris, called for a procedure to determine 
who would be eligible for receiving the Talmud. In the United 
States, under the direction of Leo Jung at Yeshiva University, the 
Joint established a committee which identified two groups of re-
cipients. Within the North American allocation many individuals 
and institutions would receive one volume. Relatively few would 
receive an entire set. The criteria were flexible but this committee 
and its agents abroad favored rabbis who had survived the Holo-
caust and those like Rabbi Herbert Friedman who, as Rabbi Bern-
stein's assistant, had been directly and actively involved in produc-
56 Information Bulletin, 1950, 33, 35; Schwartz to Joint, March 5, 1951; Theodore 
D. Feder to Tarshansky, April 25, 1951; Sam Haber to Louis Barish, November 
16, 1950; Shapiro to Tarshansky, November 10, 1950, Joint Archives. 
57 Ibid., June 21, 1950, November 10, 1950, December 5, 1950, Joint Archives. 
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ing the Survivors' Talmud in Germany. Besides them, in the United 
States and Canada, a number of religious and secular institutions 
received a complete set of the Talmud.58 
There were disagreements. A number of individuals strained to 
have their way. Rabbi Michael Munk had been the rabbi for the 
Berlin Gemeinde and claimed that between April 1947 and March 
1948 he had been involved with the effort to print the Talmud. "I 
was quite instrumental and helpful in the development of this proj-
ect and quite often had to participate in negotiations in Frankfurt 
and Munich." He thought he was entitled to an entire set, not just 
one volume. Besides, he wrote to the Joint Committee on Cultural 
and Religious Affairs, he had escaped from Germany and had been 
promised a set in Munich when he left for the United States. The 
committee checked its files. S. Tarshansky wrote to Sam Haber, the 
Joint's man in Munich: "When we engaged him for the Berlin 
Gemeinde we made it very clear that he was to serve as rabbi to the 
Gemeinde solely, and was not to be involved in the general JDC 
program in behalf of the DPs." For his part Sam Haber in Munich 
had no patience for these claims. "Let it clearly be stated, once and 
for all, that I personally never promised a Shaas (or for that matter 
anything else) to any one, and so anyone who makes such a claim 
can be told outright that they are talking through their yarmalki. 
. . ." Rabbi Snieg had made up his lists and had excluded those 
whom he considered unworthy. "Stick to the original list and say 
there are none left."59 
For some, the Survivors' Talmud as a set, or one of its volumes, 
served as a device for fund raising. Joseph H. Lookstein recalled in 
1951 that he had talked about the project with "Rabbi Snieg in 1945 
when the task was first begun . . . it served," wrote Lookstein, "as 
one of the successful themes in UJA appeals." More revealing about 
fund raisers and Joint officials was an exchange of notes between 
Henrietta Buchman and the Allied Jewish Appeal of Philadelphia. 
She had sent one volume and expressed the hope that it would 
"serve as a stimulus to the congregations and synagogues in your 
city in strengthening their efforts and increasing their measure of 
financial help so as to enable us to continue the work of rebuilding 
the spirit of our people in the overseas countries." "How would 
you," responded David J. Gaiter of the Philadelphia Campaign, 
"like to receive volume four of the Encyclopedia Britannica just as 
58 Shapiro to Tarshansky, December 7,1950; Friedman to Joint, May 21, 1951, Joint 
Archives. 
59 Munk to Joint, May 25, 1951; Tarshansky to Haber, April 16, 1951; Haber to 
Tarshansky, May 3, 1951, Joint Archives. 
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a memento?" The campaign's Special Events Committee unani-
mously decided that one volume could not stimulate fund raisers. 
"The opinion was. . . that the presentation of one volume such as 
you recommend was meaningless." The campaign organizers knew 
precisely what they wanted and why. We feel "that if a set of the 
Talmud was presented by the J o i n t . . . to the Jews of Philadelphia 
through the Allied Jewish Appeal we could stage an event that 
would prove most stimulating spiritually, and at the same time most 
profitable. Frankly," wrote Albert H. Lieberman, a realtor, "our 
people feel that as the third largest Jewish community in America, 
the JDC should give us a set. You do that," predicted the fund 
raiser, "and see what will happen. It looks as if we will be 300,000 
s h o r t . . . . we will need a special for a closing dinner and the Talmud 
may be the impetus. . . ."s0 
But there were also the devoted, those who were simply grateful 
for the Survivors' Talmud and who appreciated its significance. 
Rabbi William F. Rosenblum thanked the Joint for one volume. He 
had been in Germany in the summer of 1946 on behalf of the 
Synagogue Council. "There I learned of the plans to print the 
Babylonian Talmud and of the splendid cooperation that was given 
to the project by the American Military in Germany. . . ." Rabbi de 
Sola Pool captured some of the intent of the project. "The whole 
undertaking is one of rare dramatic character," he wrote. "I am sure 
you do not object if I make some needy refugee rabbi the benefici-
ary of this volume." Rabbi Robert Gordis took the long view: 
". . . the historical circumstance surrounding the publication of this 
great treasure-house of the Jewish spirit," he told Leo Jung, "make 
the volume precious." Leo Jung himself expressed the sentiment of 
those who started the project in the first place. This Talmud ". . . 
represents in part the resurrection of Jewish life overseas since the 
war." Rabbi Menachem M. Schneersohn, whose father-in-law was 
pulled out of occupied Poland with the help of the Joint in 1940, 
caught the meaning of the entire project. "The Babylonian Talmud, 
our oral law, which goes hand in hand with our written law (the 
Bible) represents our greatest and most sacred spiritual heritage, the 
very soul of our people and the life of our exile." This was the un-
qualified language of the Talmudic Jew Rabbis Snieg and Rose in 
Munich would have understood and endorsed. 
The reprinting of this vast treasure would have been an occasion for 
rejoicing at all times. In our present day, after the Hitlerite hordes have 
destroyed a great many of our living Talmud together with other holy 
60 Lookstein to Buchman, April 16, 1951; Buchman to Gaiter, May 2, 1951; Gaiter 
to Buchman, May 3, 1951; Lieberman to Buchman, May 9, 1951, Joint Archives. 
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books and the famous European presses, the reprinting of the Talmud 
is not only a fitting monument to our great tragedy, but it fills an urgent 
need. 
This rabbi wrote with inspiration: "That it was printed in the very 
country which had set out to spread a blanket of darkness over the 
whole world, has a touch of Divine Justice." In contrast, Israel's 
Prime Minister Ben Gurion's office was matter-of-fact. Ruth 
Havicho, for him, acknowledged recepit of the new edition of the 
Vilna Talmud "brought to print by the J.D.C. Thank you."61 
Among those who knew how to treasure the Survivor's Talmud 
on terms shared by the initiators, two rabbis had been especially in-
volved with the events that had made the project necessary. They 
expressed their passion poignantly. Herbert A. Friedman had been 
Bernstein's assistant. "Secretly, 1 have cherished the hope for a long 
time that I would be able to have one. I hesitated to ask but by coin-
cidence," he wrote a friend at the Joint on 13 February 1951, he 
mentioned to a mutual friend "two weekends ago, that I really 
had always wanted a set - both for the sentimental memories it 
evokes, and because of the fact that I do not possess a complete 
Shaas. . . . " " 
In Israel there came a different response from a man who had 
lost his wife and children in Hungary and had recently been ap-
pointed rabbi to a small settlement outside of Jerusalem. Here is the 
dedication he had inscribed in private on the title page of Volume 
One: 
May it be Thy will that I be privileged to dwell quietly in the land; to 
study the holy Torah amid contentment of mind, peace, and security for 
the rest of my days; that I may learn, teach, heed, do and fulfill in love 
all the words of Thy Love. May I yet be remembered for salvation for 
the sake of my parents who sanctified Thy name when living and when 
led to their martyr's death. May their blood be avenged! May 1 merit to 
witness soon the final redemption of Israel. Amen." 
Yet even among these pious devotees, material requirements 
could affect the uses of the project. As had the army or the fund 
raisers, so, too, did Rabbi Snieg have other agendas. In the days 
before the establishment of the State of Israel the publication of the 
Talmud appeared to Rabbi Snieg as a major event in Jewish history. 
61 Rosenblum to Leavitt, May 16, 1961; de Sola Pool to Leavitt, May 14, 1951; Leo 
Jung in JDC News Release, February 1, 1951; Schneersohn to Leavitt, April 18, 
1951; Havicho to JDC, January 22, 1951; Robert Gordis to Leo Jung, April 17, 
1951, Joint Archives. 
62 Friedman to Leavitt, February 13, 1951, Joint Archives. 
63 Rabbi Goldman to Shapiro, December 25, 1951, Joint Archives. 
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He and Rabbi Rose said so in the dedication printed in the first 
volume. 
In 1946 we turned to the American Army Commander to assist us in the 
publication of the Talmud. In all the years of exile it has often happened 
that various governments and forces have burned Jewish books. Never 
did any publish them for us. This is the first time in Jewish history that 
a government has helped in the publication of the Talmud, which is the 
source of our being and the length of our days. The Army of the United 
States saved us from death, protects us in this land, and through their 
aid does the Talmud appear again in Germany. . . . 
However, survivor Snieg also had to worry about his later years and 
so he turned to the project for securing or helping to secure the days 
of his retirement. Although it is not clear just when he started to 
give retirement problems serious thought, by November 1950 the 
Joint had started to take account of the possibility that the Talmud 
project could also be used for personal gain. 
Just before the first large shipments left Antwerp and Marseilles, 
Shapiro arranged to give Rabbis Snieg and Rose the plates from 
which the copies of the Talmud had been printed, and for Haber in 
Munich to draw up an agreement between himself, as agent of the 
Joint, and Rabbis Snieg and Rose. "For the moment, there are no 
immediate plans for the printing of the Talmud," Shapiro wrote 
New York, "but because there is a shortage of this item in the world, 
and because of the further possibility that the Rabbis may wish to 
engage in some venture which may result in some income for them 
. . ." he thought it best that a contract between the Joint and the 
rabbis ought to rest in New York's files. The value of the plates was 
obvious. The making of them had been the army's important and 
expensive contribution; one estimate placed it at a value of $50,000 
and the Joint's portion at a value of $35,000. The Joint turned the 
plates over to the rabbis and both parties to the contract agreed to 
the following stipulations: in the future, the plates could not be used 
for printing the Talmud in Germany. Ultimately the plates belonged 
in Israel. "We further agree," the document concluded, "that prior 
to the use of the photo-offset at any time . . . AJDC will be notified 
and concurrence of this organization in writing must be obtained 
prior to their use." Rabbi Snieg signed as Chief Rabbi of Germany, 
Rabbi Rose as a member of the Rabbinate of the U.S. Zone belong-
ing to the Central Committee of Liberated Jews. On 29 November 
1950 Shapiro instructed New York to file the contract "carefully for 
recall."64 
Three years later it was recalled. By then illness and suffering had 
64 Shapiro to M. W. Beckelman, November 29, 1950, Joint Archives. 
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taken its toll. Rabbi Snieg, reported Haber, "is a very sick man, 
practically blind. . . ." He and Rabbi Rose had been living in freed 
Germany since their liberation. After Israel was founded, both had 
hopes of settling there. Snieg's frail health affected those hopes. In 
1953 Haber wrote: "I believe that if Snieg wanted to go to Israel 
today I would - in all honesty - be impelled to advise him against 
such a move. . . ." He nevertheless thought of Israel as a future 
home even as he remained in Germany and travelled to Switzerland 
for medical treatments. Clearly, it would become harder for Rabbi 
Snieg to support himself as he grew older and more frail: "all in all 
a very pathetic person," said Haber.65 
In July 1953 a Joint official became suspicious about Rabbi 
Snieg's intentions. Buchman had heard about a fund raising drive 
among Orthodox rabbis eager to publish sets of the Survivors' 
Talmud. "I wonder if Snieg has made any deals with them," she 
asked Haber in Munich. Haber wrote that there was no deal yet. But 
he did report a complicated scheme in which Snieg wanted to 
become involved. Snieg appreciated the Joint's opposition to "re-
peating the performance in Germany." Instead he wanted to partici-
pate in a scheme which used a "dummy" company to hide the in-
volvement of rabbis and of a Diisseldorf firm that intended to print 
Talmud sets made from the army plates. The arrangement called for 
the bills, resulting from printing and shipment costs, to go to the 
Diisseldorf firm without in any way involving the dummy company, 
the rabbis or the Joint. "In other words," explained Haber, "the 
JDC as such would have absolutely nothing to do with the project, 
but it would involve our acquiescence in their use of the plates in 
Germany." Snieg's scheme would also use tax-exempt funds and 
individuals who, Shapiro said, wanted "to make an easy mark." 
Haber in turn justified Snieg's reasoning: he simply wants to earn 
some money to sustain him in his last years while helping to provide 
more German-printed Talmud sets to fill the still existing need. 
Haber and Shapiro remained sympathetic to Snieg's efforts but this 
scheme went nowhere. Considering his poor health, and assuming 
the Joint could stay "completely clear of the project . . ." Haber 
"would not be too strongly opposed to letting Rabbi Snieg go ahead 
if as a result. . . [he] could earn some money. . . ." But both Haber 
and Shapiro realized that the Joint could not stay clear of the 
machinations involved in the Diisseldorf scheme. It came to 
naught.66 
65 Haber to Shapiro, July 29, 1953; Haber to Buchman, July 8, 1953. Joint 
Archives. 
66 Buchman to Haber, July 2, October 20, 1953; Haber to Buchman, July 8, 29, 
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According to Henrietta Buchman, who had dealt with the 
Philadelphia fund raisers, that urge to use the Talmud as a money 
maker was also inherent in the activities of Rabbi Kalmanowitz and 
other Orthodox Jews associated with the international Orthodox 
Jewish rescue committee and other sections of the Vaad Hara-
banim. She wrote Shapiro in Paris that the "VH is using the Talmud 
. . . project purely as a fund raising device."67 While Shapiro and 
others in the Joint did not invariably suspect Orthodox Jewish 
activities, Buchman was suspicious. "I would be very much sur-
prised if any part of the money they collect actually goes to sup-
plying . . . Yeshivoth in Israel." She knew that the Joint had con-
tributed $5,000 to the VH in Israel so that it could arrange for the 
printing and distribution of 25,000 copies of selected portions of 
the Talmud. "I assure you that even if we shouted that fact from the 
rooftops, the VH would still tell the public that they need money for 
additional Gemoroth, or as they claim, sets of the Talmud for the 
Yeshivoth in Israel." She was certain that contemporary Jewish his-
tory was on her side: even in the early days of the project the Joint 
had not worked with the VH. Now with Israel a state, the anti-
clerical Jews triumphant, and assimilation in America in high gear, 
there was no doubt in her mind. To be sure, she did not list all those 
circumstances. Instead, she said the VH "is slowly dying a natural 
death anyway."68 
In the beginning of 1954, Israel's Ministry of Religion activated 
Snieg's personal agenda. Z. Warhaftig, in 1954 Deputy Minister for 
Religious Affairs, had discussed the plates from the Talmud project 
with M. W. Beckelman, then the director of the Joint's office in 
Paris. "I would like to ask you," he now wrote the Joint, "to be kind 
enough to see to it that the plates of the large Shaas which the Joint 
printed sometime ago in Germany be sent to the Religious Depart-
ment of the State of Israel . . ." Warhaftig's purpose was clear 
enough. With the plates in Tel Aviv, the Ministry could print the 
Shaas "in Israel and distribute it mainly among the Yeshivoth, 
1953; Haber to Shapiro, July 29, 1953; Shapiro to Goldschmidt, August 18, 1953, 
Joint Archives. 
67 See, for example, Shapiro's response to Rabbi J. Goldman, January 17, 1951, 
Joint Archives, who in Jerusalem tried to "avoid headaches" by not giving the 
Talmud to Israeli Yeshivot on the grounds that they did not receive "regular allo-
cations" from the Joint. Shapiro's criterion was the quality of education at the 
Yeshivah. For headaches he was prepared to "supply sufficient quantity of 
aspirin." On tensions between Orthodox rabbis and the Joint early in the war see 
Efraim Zuroff, "Rescue Priority and Fund Raising as Issues During the Holo-
caust: A Case Study of the Relation Between the Vaad Ha-Hatzala and the Joint, 
1933-1941," American Jewish History, LXVIIl (March, 1979), 305-326. 
68 Buchman to Shapiro, October 30, 1952, Joint Archives. 
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rabbis, and scholars who cannot afford the Shassim if ordered from 
abroad." Once again the contract with Snieg and Rose was pulled 
from the files. On November 13, 1950 the DP rabbis had agreed that 
the plates "eventually" would be shipped to Israel. Warhaftig was 
referred to Rabbi Snieg. This time the Joint's man Beekelman wrote: 
"The JDC would naturally approve any arrangement that you 
would reach with Rabbi Snieg." There was reason for optimism. 
There was something special about these contacts between Snieg 
and Warhaftig. "I believe this will be the simplest way of facilitating 
the arrangement you are seeking, particularly since," recalled 
Beekelman, "if my memory serves me correctly, you and Rabbi 
Snieg are acquainted from as far back as our days in Lithuania 
together in 1939 and 1940."69 AH from Kovno! 
Neither Warhaftig, nor Beekelman for the Joint, worried especi-
ally about Rabbis Snieg or Rose. Israel was calling. Tel Aviv had 
contacted them through its Purchasing Mission in Cologne expect-
ing full cooperation from the liberated Kovnoites who had been a 
part of the pro-Israel Central Committeee. Cooperation was forth-
coming, but the rabbis would not relinquish Snieg's personal 
agenda. Warhaftig, Snieg and Rabbi Rose agreed to print 200 sets 
in Germany. Since by this time Israel and Germany had worked out 
a reparations agreement, the Mission contacted the German govern-
ment for "the release of funds to cover this expense. . . ." For their 
part Snieg and Rose were prepared to help the Israelis, free of 
charge, but they still refused to give up the plates. "They were the 
initiators of the project, they were the moving spirit behind the 
whole idea." The Military Government, they said, "would have 
given the plates to them, but because they were private individuals 
they could not be given the plates directly. . . ." According to the 
rabbis, in the transfer of the plates the Joint had served as a techni-
cal convenience. To the Joint's man in Tel Aviv all this seemed 
strange. Beekelman "who was anxious to help the Israeli govern-
ment . . . felt that these plates rightly belonged to Israel for the use 
of Yeshivoth." So he was prepared to buy out Snieg and Rose "to 
transfer the plates to Israel. . . ."70 
The fact was that Rabbi Snieg still had political and financial 
plans of his own. He did not respond to the State of Israel in quite 
the same way as Warhaftig or Beekelman. For Snieg, established 
rabbinic authorities, not the Jewish State's government officials, 
constituted the critical reference group. He did not want to give the 
69 Warhaftig to Beekelman, January 2, 1954; Beekelman to Warhaftig, March 5, 
1954, Joint Archives. 
70 Stanley Abramovitch to Charles Passman, December 15, 1955. 
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plates to the Ministry because that would indeed have given them 
to the one religious party which had joined the government coali-
tion ruling Israel. That party, not his party, carried the portfolio of 
the Ministry of Religion. Snieg wanted to consult the Belzer Rabbi, 
and other leading religious personalities outside of the govern-
ment.71 He seemed to have in mind some sort of religious public 
body which would properly accept the plates in the name of 
Europe's surviving Orthodox Jewry. 
Rabbi Sneig was also trying to protect his personal future. 
Stanley Abramovitch, who spoke to him on behalf of the Joint, 
reported that the rabbi still had hopes to emigrate to Israel; he plans 
to visit there at "the end of this winter." Even though he realized 
that the Talmud plates were worn down he assumed that in his 
hands they would assure him of a basic income that would secure 
his future livelihood. His reasoning was direct. In Israel he did not 
wish to accept a position as a rabbi of a small town or village. He 
also did not expect to receive a position in a larger town.72 Instead 
he looked to the plates of the Talmud, to the project he had started 
when no one could have been certain that a Jewish state would come 
into being within two years. These plates would protect him. 
In the end they did not, they could not. Like the rest of European 
Talmudic Jewry, his Talmud plates were all but finished. Perhaps 
that sense about European Jewry had been the fundamental mean-
ing of Sam Haber's note to New York in February of 1951: ". . . 
emigration has fortunately stepped up so that in the next four or 
five months our problems should really be with the hardcore and 
maladjusted. The schlemiels, I am afraid, will be on our necks for 
some time to come."73 The Joint remained bound to the agreements 
in its files, that is the final word left with Rabbis Snieg and Rose. 
It was willing to cooperate but it could not provide the Minister with 
any financial assistance. "After all," wrote Henrietta Buchman on 
January 25, 1956, "this is a project which the Ministry of Religion 
was willing to finance in the first instance if we secured the plates 
from Rabbi Snieg."74 
The Survivors' Talmud project had come to an end. Judah 
Shapiro, involved in the Joint's side of the project from the be-
ginning, explained that no more than 200 sets could actually be 
printed from the plates; the original zinc plates had been worn down 
and could not produce more than 200 sets and the additional 25 
71 Loc. cit. 
72 Loc. cit. 
73 Haber to Leavitt, February 12, 1951, Joint Archives. 
74 Buchman to Jordan, January 25, 1956, Joint Archives. 
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that are usually printed to protect against damaged pages. Under 
such circumstances Shapiro had suggested that new plates could be 
made more economically in Israel or in Holland from Survivors' 
Talmud sets available. Rabbi Snieg had lost the plates' protection. 
His Talmud on zinc could no longer be reproduced in Europe. "In 
any event," wrote Buchman of the American Joint, "these are ques-
tions which can best be determined in Israel."75 Clearly, the new 
State had even started to penetrate clerkdoms of Jewish Euro-
American pasts. Eight years after that special historical moment, 
when despair had competed with religious tenacity and passions of 
national "revival," a new Jewish future had begun to form. 
7S Loc. cit. 
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